The Park Place Economist
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 18

4-1999

The Benefits of a Fully Funded Social Security System
Nathan Taulbee '00
Illinois Wesleyan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace

Recommended Citation
Taulbee '00, Nathan (1999) "The Benefits of a Fully Funded Social Security
System," The Park Place Economist: Vol. 7
Available at: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol7/iss1/18
This Article is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Commons @ IWU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this material in any
way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights
are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/ or on the work itself. This material
has been accepted for inclusion by faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.

The Benefits of a Fully Funded Social Security System
Abstract
Congress has discussed several reform proposals [for the Social Security system], but has failed to agree
on a solution that maintains the redistributive structure of the current system while also providing
economic advantages. This paper consists of several additional sections that logically demonstrate why
a fully funded system with the buildup of a large permanent trust fund is the most advantageous Social
Security reform proposal.
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I. INTRODUCTION

reforming the Social Security system.

The Social Security system, formally
known as Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
Disability Insurance (OASDI), began in 1935
under the direction of former President Franklin
Roosevelt. The original purpose of the system
was to ensure that the nation’s elderly could earn
a decent income in the later years of their life. At
that time, the elderly experienced horrific
financial turmoil as numerous banks failed due
to the Great Depression and the stock market
crash of 1929. The implementation of the Social
Security system pleased many Americans in the
1930’s, and has continued to persevere
throughout the latter portion of the twentieth
century. However, recent data indicate that
funding for the system will be exhausted in 2029
(Sass, 1997). Congress has discussed several
reform proposals, but has failed to agree on a
solution that maintains the redistributive structure
of the current system while also providing
economic advantages. This paper consists of
several additional sections that logically
demonstrate why a fully funded system with the
buildup of a large permanent trust fund is the most
advantageous Social Security reform proposal.
In Section II, the specific reasons why the system
is financially unsound today will be discussed.
Section III will examine research on the major
reform proposals. Section IV will explain what
a fully funded system is. Sections V and VII will
explain how a fully funded system can be
achieved. Section VI will examine the advantages
and disadvantages of a fully funded system in
comparison to other reform proposals. Empirical
analysis will assist in supporting this claim.
Finally, the last section will offer some concluding
thoughts on the macroeconomic effects of

II. WHY THE SYSTEM IS FINANCIALLY
UNSOUND TODAY
The original intent of the Social Security
system was that a fully funded system financed by
the payroll tax would be used as a government
transfer program to assist the elderly poor. Since
that time, however, several changes have been made.
For example, in 1939 the U.S. government replaced
the fully funded system with a pay-as-you-go system
in order to meet the needs of current retirees. Under
a pay-as-you-go system, payroll tax revenues from
current workers are used for the payments to current
recipients. The problem with the pay-as-you-go
system is that the projected support-benefit ratio will
not be adequate to continue Social Security far into
the 21st century. According to the Cato Institute,
only 2 workers will support a beneficiary in 2025,
as opposed to the 16 workers that supported each
beneficiary in 1950 (Shipman, 1995). The primary
cause of this is that the abundant Baby Boom
generation will soon reach retirement, causing a
dramatic increase in the needed revenues to pay for
retirees. In addition, the birthrate has declined
tremendously since the mid-1900’s from at least 2.5
children per woman to less than 2 children per
woman. According to the Social Security
Administration, this trend is expected to continue
into the 21st century (Beach, 1998). Finally,
Americans are living much longer due to medical
advances, causing the support-benefit ratio to decline
even more. Table 1 illustrates the rising trend of
additional years lived beyond retirement. (Beach,
1998)
With the decline in the support-benefit ratio,
payroll tax revenues will eventually no longer meet
the benefit outlays. When this occurs, the
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government will then use money from the Social
The main proposal for altering the current
Security Trust Fund to pay for the deficit. In essence,
system while maintaining its defined-benefit
the trust fund serves as a safety net in times of Social
structure is the one that implements a fully funded
Security deficits. Beginning in 2012, revenues from
system with the buildup of a large trust fund. This
current workers will not cover the payments to
reform proposal offers great economic advantages
current retirees, which means that the government
that the privatization proposals do not offer. A
must delve into the trust fund.
greater examination of this
Table1: Average Life ExpectAccording to data from the
proposal along with its
ancy for those reaching age 65
Social Security Administration,
advantage will be discussed in
the current trust fund will be
the next three sections.
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exhausted in 2029, as deficits
Meanwhile, the two major
are projected to continue well
privatization proposals, the
1935
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after 2012 (Sass, 1997). As a
Individual Accounts proposal
result of this, many workers that
and the Personal Savings
1998
17
paid into the system would not
Accounts proposal, are based on
2
0
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0
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9
receive the benefits they
a defined contribution element in
expected in retirement. In order
addition to the defined benefit
to continue a successful Social
element. That is, retirees receive
Security program that maintains a redistribution
a general amount of funding determined by the
element, reform is needed today.
current benefit formula along with a specific amount
of funding that is determined by the success of that
III. A REVIEW OF MAJOR REFORM
retiree’s contribution account. For example, under
PROPOSALS
the Individual Accounts proposal, a new 1.6 percent
Three major reform proposals that currently
employee payroll tax would be used as a source of
exist today are the Maintain Benefits proposal, the
revenue for each individual’s own account. The
Individual Accounts proposal, and the Personal
current 12.4% payroll tax that is split between
Savings Accounts proposal. Much research
employers and employees would not change under
currently exists on these proposals with clear
this proposal (Beach, 1998).
ideological beliefs impacting the findings. For
Under the Personal Savings Accounts
example, research from the Brookings Institution,
proposal, 5 percent out of the total 12.4% payroll
a rather liberal organization, supports the Maintain
tax would go toward a privately managed personal
Benefits proposal while research from the Cato
account. The remaining 7.4 percent of the payroll
Institute, a libertarian organization, favors the
tax would be used as a “flat retirement” benefit for
privatization proposals.
recipients. The primary difference between the
The chief characteristics of the Maintain
Personal Savings Account proposal and the
Benefits proposal is that the current defined benefit
Individual Accounts proposal is that individuals
structure of Social Security will be maintained with
manage the investment of funds in the former
slight alterations being made to the size of the trust
account while the government manages funds in the
fund. Under a defined benefit Social Security
latter account (Beach, 1998).
system, a benefit formula based on an individual’s
Because the Individual Accounts proposal
average career earnings along with his or her age
and the Personal Savings Accounts proposal both
determines the amount received in retirement. The
favor a defined contribution component to Social
intent of this benefit formula is to redistribute income
Security, less revenue would be available for
to those with lower average career earnings. The
redistribution to the elderly poor. The Cato Institute
redistributive component of the current system is
favors these privatization proposals primarily
the primary reason why members of the Brookings
because of the individual choice that they would
Institution favor the Maintain Benefits proposal.
offer (Shipman, 1995). Though many people favor
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year’s expenditures.” (Diamond, 1997) In addition,
the Board of Trustees made the following
conclusions about a large permanent trust fund:

privatization and believe it is the answer to the
current Social Security crisis, having a fully funded
system with a large trust fund is the most
advantageous proposal. The remainder of the paper
will examine the characteristics and advantages of
a fully funded system along with the disadvantages
of a privatized system.

“If the estimated trust fund ratio for a fund
is at least 100 percent at the beginning of the
projection period, then it must be projected to
remain at or above 100 percent throughout the
10-year projection period. Alternatively, if the
ratio is initially less than 100 percent, then it must
be projected to reach a level of at least 100 percent
by the beginning of the sixth year and to remain
at or above 100 percent throughout the remainder
of the 10-year period. Failure to meet this test …
is an indication that solvency of the program over
the next 10 years is in question and that
Congressional action is needed to improve the
short-range financial adequacy of the program.”
(Diamond, 1997)

IV. WHAT EXACTLY IS A FULLY FUNDED
SYSTEM?
As stated previously, the Social Security
system currently operates under a partially funded
system. That is, payroll tax revenues from current
workers are used for current retirees. And in years
of a Social Security deficit, the trust fund will be
used as the additional source of revenue needed to
pay benefits to retirees. Under a fully funded system,
all benefits paid out to recipients come directly from
the revenue in the trust fund. When a large enough
trust fund is achieved, current workers will no longer
have to support current retirees. But what exactly
determines whether the trust fund is large enough
to be deemed “permanent?” According to the Board
of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds,
“The long-range [permanent] estimates include the
cost of ending the seventy-five year projection period
with a trust fund equal to 100% of the following

It may not seem like much of a problem to
achieve this defined permanent trust. However,
moving from the current partially funded system to
a fully funded system requires in-depth analysis.
V. HOW TO ACHIEVE A FULLY FUNDED
SYSTEM
In order to obtain a fully funded system,

Figure 1: Social Security Inflows versus Outflows
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Congress first must eliminate the projected 2012
Social Security deficit (Beach, 1995). Figure 1, a
graph from the 1995 Bipartisan Commission on
Entitlement and Tax Reform, illustrates the rise in
Social Security outflows relative to inflows over a
37-year period, with the breakeven point occurring
at the projected 2012 date (Shipman, 1995).
To eliminate the projected 2012 deficit,
several modifications must be made to the current
system. One such modification requires increasing
the working period over which a retiree’s benefits
are computed. It is estimated that the projected
Social Security deficit will be reduced by 12% if
benefits are computed over a period of 38 years
rather than 35 years. This is because each recipient’s
payment will be lower due to the three additional
lower income years (Overview, 1998).
In addition to adding lower-wage years to
the benefit computation, the Social Security deficit
can also be reduced if government workers are added
to the system. Expanding coverage to the 3.7 million
state and local government employees would reduce
the projected Social Security deficit by 10%
(Overview, 1998).
A third modification that would reduce the
Social Security deficit is an acceleration of the future
retirement age to 67. Currently, those individuals
age 65 and older are considered retirees (though
early and late retirement is possible). The Social
Security Act of 1983 called for an increase in the
retirement age to 67 by 2022. By increasing the
retirement age to 67 in 2011 rather than 2022, 22%
of the projected Social Security budget deficit can
be reduced (Overview, 1998).
A fourth way of reducing the projected
deficit is by reducing the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) by .21 percent each year. Many economists
believe that the CPI can be reduced even further
because it currently overstates inflation
tremendously. The effect of a .21 percent adjustment
to the CPI would reduce the projected Social
Security deficit by 14% (Overview, 1998).
A final way of reducing the 2012 Social
Security deficit is through taxation of any additional
benefits a retiree receives beyond what he or she
contributed. Implementing this policy would reduce
the deficit by 14% also (Overview, 1998). These

five measures put together would reduce the
projected Social Security deficit by an estimated
72%.
Once the projected Social Security deficit
is eliminated, Congress must find a way to add to
the current trust fund in order to build up a large
permanent trust fund. One such way to accomplish
this is through a payroll tax increase. According to
actuarial data from the Social Security
Administration, a permanent 2.23 percent increase
in the payroll tax would restore financial balance
over the next 75 years (Diamond, 1997). However,
this raises questions of equity, since the payroll tax
is a flat rate as opposed to a progressive rate. Perhaps
a more equitable solution is to build up the trust
fund with increased income taxation. By taxing
income over payroll, higher income individuals will
pay more into the large trust fund. Implementing a
progressive structure into the buildup of the large
trust fund is necessary to maintain the redistributive
component of Social Security.
Finally, with the recent budget surpluses and
the predicted future surpluses, Congress should
consider allocating portions of these surpluses to the
Social Security Trust Fund. By doing this, the
government can build up the trust fund without
raising income tax rates as much. In conclusion, by
implementing any combination of these
modifications to the current Social Security system,
Congress can make steps toward eliminating the
projected 2012 Social Security deficit and building
a permanent trust fund.
VI. THE ADVANTAGES OF A FULLY
FUNDED SYSTEM
A fully funded Social Security system would
be very beneficial for several reasons. One reason
is that when full funds are obtained, the system will
have fewer worries over future near-term projected
deficits. The government would then be able to
concentrate on more demanding issues.
A similar advantage of a fully funded system
is that it maintains much of the structure of the
current system. Many Americans will likely be
pleased to maintain the current system that has
proven to be popular in its years of existence.
Because of this, members of Congress will be able
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economic growth, is the necessary tool to
to focus on other, more pressing issues on Capital
demonstrate how building up the trust fund will
Hill in Washington, D.C.
In addition to political reasons, a fully
increase future living standards. According to
Figure 2, as savings increases, sf(k)1, the current
funded system would also give the government more
opportunities to invest a portion of the funds in
saving rate in the economy, shifts to sf(k)2, the new
equities. Numerous studies indicate that investing
saving rate in the economy, and a new equilibrium
a portion of the trust fund into equities would
amount of capital per worker (k2) in achieved. And
increase the rate of return tremendously. For
according to Macroeconomic theory, as the original
example, according to the Advisory Council of
capital per worker level k1 rises to k2, additional
Social Security, if the U.S. began to build a
gross domestic product (GDP) can be produced,
permanent trust fund with government securities in
resulting in economic growth. One important
1997, that trust fund would hold approximately $1
outcome of the 41st annual economic conference of
trillion. If 40% of the trust fund in 1997 were
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston is that
invested in equities, that
privatization does not
same trust fund would
have the same impact
Figure
2:
The
Effect
of
Increased
Social
Secuhold $60 trillion
on national saving that
rity on Capital Stock per Worker
(Diamond, 1997).
the buildup of a large
Though investing a
permanent trust fund
portion of the trust fund
(h+n+g)k
would have. According
Steady
into equities provides a
to Triest, “Privatization
State
f(k)
Output
much greater return, it
of Social Security
sf(k)2
and
is important to note that
might be a politically
Investsf(k)1
a much greater amount
feasible means of
ment
of risk is involved. In
achieving increased
addition,
the
pre-funding, but by
government would
itself would not
K1
K2
have partial ownership
necessarily increase
[national] saving.”
of many American
companies, which has
(Sass, 1997)
Another advantage of a fully funded system
many political drawbacks. Although some
that privatization proposals do not have is its
disadvantages do exist with private investment of
redistributive makeup. Since Social Security was
the Social Security Trust Fund, the main advantage
established as a transfer program to assist the poor
of having a large trust fund as opposed to the current
elderly, a fully funded system does not change the
trust fund in regard to equity investments is that the
redistributive structure of the current system.
government has more room for error.
Although the size of the Social Security funds may
The chief economic advantage of preserving
change with a permanent trust fund, nothing is done
Social Security with a fully funded system is that
to the allocation of these funds. Thus the defined
national saving (public saving minus private saving)
benefit structure of the current system is maintained.
will increase, thus inducing future growth in the
On the contrary, various privatization proposals
economy. According to Steven Sass and Robert
st
eliminate part or all of the defined benefit structure
Triest, two participants in the 41 annual economic
conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
in favor of a defined contribution structure, making
in June, 1997, increasing funding of Social Security
Social Security less redistributive. The reason for
will “restore Social Security’s fiscal solvency” and
this is that a certain percentage of individual’s
“increase national saving and future living
payroll tax revenues would be placed in a private
standards.” (Sass, 1997) The Solow growth model,
account that could only be utilized by that
a macroeconomic model that links savings to
individual. The primary problem with this is that
80
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less money is available for redistribution, making
Social Security more of a complete pension program
rather than a transfer program. It is essential to
remember that Social Security is a government
transfer program aimed at helping the elderly poor.

receive payments during the transition period.
Perhaps the most equitable solution to this transition
period problem is to spread the burden over
everyone. This can be accomplished by reducing
benefits of current retirees while raising the payroll
tax rate beyond what is needed to help build up the
permanent trust fund.

VII. THE DISADVANTAGES OF A FULLY
FUNDED SYSTEM
Though a fully funded system has many
VIII. CONCLUSION
advantages, some drawbacks are present. For
Reforming Social Security is not an easy
example, increasing saving to build up the larger
task. Although moving toward a defined-benefit
trust for higher future consumption results in less
fully funded system with a permanent trust has many
consumption today. Figure 3 demonstrates how
advantages, critics still claim that it is not the right
GDP will fall in the short
solution.
Some
run due to a downward
opponents argue that
Figure
3:
Short-Run
Impact
of
an
Increased
shift in the aggregate
the transition costs to a
Trust Fund
demand curve (AD1 to
fully funded system
AD2) because of the
would require some
LRAS
Price Level
decreased consumption
generations to “pay
levels of both retirees
twice.” However, any
and employees. As
reform proposal would
aggregate demand
result
in
one
B
A
SRAS
drops, the equilibrium
generation paying
C
amount of output falls
more than “its fair
AD1
from Point A to Point B.
share.” According to
AD2
In the long run, the
data found by The
Income, Output
economy will move to
Century Foundation,
Point C, the full
in addition to requiring
employment level of
the current generation
output (located on the long-run aggregate supply
of workers to “pay twice,” privatization of Social
curve).
Although the decline in output today
Security would also require about $6.5 trillion in
(the move from Point A to Point B) results in
additional taxes over the next 72 years. Other
economic hardship for Americans, this hardship can
opponents claim that selecting a permanent trust
be justified by the fact that the nation’s pool of saving
fund over privatization lowers the rate of return for
and capital stock would be reduced in the future
retirees. Though this may be true if a portion of the
large trust fund is not invested in equities, how can
anyway [if no changes were made to the current
anyone be sure that the stock market will remain a
system] because of the necessary sale of trust fund
safe investment source in the future? When
assets expected in 2019 (Sass, 8). Thus the question
factoring in the additional taxation of privatization,
becomes one of sacrificing now for the continuation
st
the insecurity of private individual accounts, and
of social security in the 21 century versus
sacrificing at a future time that results in no
the fact that nearly every reform proposal requires
continuation of social security.
one generation to pay more than its fair share,
A second drawback of moving toward a
proponents of privatization are left with little to
fully funded system is that one generation must pay
argue. Meanwhile, advocates of a fully funded
for itself and for the current retirees. While the
system with a permanent trust fund can claim that
permanent trust fund will be sufficient for future
increased national saving will spur future economic
retirees, current retirees must somehow continue to
growth and that, most importantly, the
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progressiveness of the current system can be
maintained.
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